



MERIDIAN JUNIOR COLLEGE
Preliminary Examination
Higher 2

H2 History

9731/01

Paper 1: International History, 1945 - 2000

17 September 2014

3 Hours

READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

Write your name and civics group clearly on all the work you hand in.
Write in dark blue or black ball point pen on both sides of the paper.
Write the number of the question that you are attempting in the margin of every sheet of paper used.
Start each question on a fresh sheet of paper.
At the end of the examination, fasten this cover sheet and all your answers (in chronological order) securely together.

Section A

Answer Question 1.

Section B

Answer any three questions.

All questions in this paper carry **25 marks**.

You are reminded of the need for good English and clear presentation in your answers.

| Question | Marks |
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| Total | |

This document consists of 4 printed pages.

SECTION A

You **must** answer Question 1.

The Secretary-General in the Rwanda Crisis

1. Read the sources and then answer the question which follows.

Source A

Interviewer:

For you personally, 10 years on, where does Rwanda sit emotionally for you?

Boutros-Ghali:

It is one of my greatest failures. I failed in Rwanda. My failure in Rwanda is greater than my failure in Somalia, because in Somalia, I was aware of what will happen once the international community withdrew from Somalia. But I was not aware of the degree of disaster in Rwanda, so it is a double failure.

It is a failure that I was not able to convince the members of the Security Council to intervene, and it is another failure that I was not able to understand from the beginning the importance of what was going on. So we have a double failure. It took me weeks before suddenly we discovered that it was genocide. So this is another kind of failure.

*Interview on the Rwandan Genocide with former
UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 2004*

Source B

In the days following the April 21 decision to reduce UNAMIR forces, mass killings skyrocketed. On April 29, Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali asked the Security Council to reconsider its decision and to consider "forceful action to restore law and order and end the massacres." On May 2, the Secretary General wrote to African heads of state requesting troops for an African peacekeeping force.

The African force never materialized. In part, U.S. refusal to commit its own troops to the effort reduced the prestige of the mission and discouraged troop-contributing nations which would have been eager to join an American-led intervention. Accordingly, the U.N. Secretary General floated a new plan - a UNAMIR II which would enlarge the existing contingent by 800 men and augment it with another battalion within a few weeks. The mandate for UNAMIR II was limited to obtaining a cease-fire, supporting humanitarian assistance, and opening the airport. But the U.S. offered an alternative plan, and weeks were lost in negotiating the differences. Finally on May 17, the Security Council voted unanimously to support a compromise plan. But even then, the U.S. insisted that the mandate of the force not be expanded to include the use of force to stop killings. Moreover, the Pentagon successfully blocked even the provision of vehicles and equipment, which, had they been provided, could at least have been used by the existing UNAMIR troops to enhance their security and enable them to travel outside of Kigali to defend concentrations of displaced Tutsi in the countryside.

US congressional testimony from a member of a human rights organisation, May 1998

Source C

The UN Charter set down the secretary-general's powers in sketchy and vague language, Boutros-Ghali was quick to establish the secretary-general as an independent power within the UN system. His assertion of independence of his office will surely count as Boutros-Ghali's most important legacy.

His skills as a communicator and diplomat were so tentative that he aroused a good deal of ill will and resentment and misunderstanding. These were substantial faults. He was never able to articulate for the public, whether within the UN or out, what changes he wanted and how he intended to make them. Perhaps even more important, he failed to make outsiders understand the limits imposed on the UN in crisis countries like Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda.

Former foreign correspondent for the Los Angeles Times, writing in 1995

Source D

Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali expressed exasperation today at the refusal of most countries to send troops to Rwanda. He called the continuing slaughter there "genocide" and said it was a "scandal" that the world has not acted speedily to end the blood-letting.

At a news conference in New York, the Secretary General described the United Nations efforts in Rwanda in harsh terms, saying: "It is a failure not only for the United Nations; it is a failure for the international community. And all of us are responsible for this failure. Not only the great powers but the African powers, the non-governmental organizations, all the international community."

"It is a genocide which has been committed. More than 200,000 people have been killed and the international community is still discussing what ought to be done."

Mr. Boutros-Ghali said he had done all he could to persuade African governments to supply the 5,500 troops he wants to send to Rwanda to protect refugees and help aid workers.

New York Times, 26 May 1994

Source E

For all Boutros-Ghali's subsequent hand-wringing, and his reproaches towards an international community that cared about "the rich man's war" in Bosnia but not wards in "orphan nations" like Rwanda, he did not begin to use the term "genocide" until more than a month after the killing began. As late as April 29, more than three weeks into the murder, Boutros-Ghali was still insisting that Rwanda was a tragedy in which Tutsi were killing Hutu and Hutu were killing Tutsi. And officials of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations insisted, publicly and privately, that, as with the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia, UNAMIR's mandate required its impartiality. If more "peacekeepers" were dispatched under the same peacekeeping mandate, these new forces would have to treat Tutsi and Hutu equally.

An excerpt from a book by an American foreign policy analyst, 2005

Now answer the following question:

How far do Sources A-E support the claim that Boutros Boutros-Ghali's ineffectiveness as the secretary-general guaranteed the failures of the United Nations in Rwanda?

SECTION B

You must answer **three** questions from this section.

- 2 How far do you agree that Truman's leadership sowed the seeds that led to the division of post-war Europe?
- 3 'It was the Cold War which worsened the Korean War, not the other way around.' Discuss.
- 4 Assess the view that it was the adoption of economic liberalisation which set into motion China's economic rise in the post-Mao era.
- 5 'The end of the Golden Age of Capitalism in the late 1970s came as a shock.' Discuss.
- 6 'Non-state players were more important than state players in the development of the Indo-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir.' Discuss in relation to the period 1947 to 2000.

- End of Paper-